Archive for the ‘Guest Author’ Category

Doing Less With Less

Wednesday, January 18th, 2012

Those of us who work for foundations want our grantees to invest in core activities that more efficiently and effectively contribute to desired outcomes. Yet funders may make it harder for grantees to do so, often by focusing exclusively on specific grant-funded activities — as opposed to outcomes — and by underinvesting in core organizational needs.

The National Bureau of Economic Research pegged the official end of the 2008/2009 recession in June of 2009. That may be true, but many foundation leaders recognized then that battered stock market valuations were only the start of what would likely be a multi-year drop in grant making, since payouts were tied to a rolling average of diminished investment portfolios.

That year, I heard far too many colleagues casually suggest that we needed to help our grantees “do more with less.” That remark has been echoed at conferences and convenings ever since. At a foundation event this fall, I challenged a colleague who expressed surprise that grantees still seemed to be doing too little to embrace the fundamental wisdom captured by this phrase. I think I understood the intent behind his lament. But the message he and others may be unintentionally conveying to grantees is unfortunate: that we believe that nonprofits have substantial resources that are being inefficiently deployed, and those of us who work for foundations would do a better job of managing the stress of decreasing revenues and increasing demand for services.

At Wilburforce Foundation, we work with grantees over the long term to protect wildlife habitats in Western North America. Investing in and disseminating science, working with local communities to build support, and convincing policymakers to endorse durable conservation solutions takes time, often years.

Many of our grantees are highly dependent on foundation grants, and we have seen firsthand the consequences of their attempts to do more with less. We’ve been tracking financial data for all of our grantees, including annual revenue and expenses, cash holdings, and net assets. Since the recession began in 2008, more than one third of the groups we support have experienced decreases in net assets of 10 percent or more, and many more have cash-flow cushions that can be measured in weeks, not months.

One of our grantees nearly collapsed in the aftermath of the recession. Many of its programs were funded by restricted grants, and foundations invariably wanted their grant-funded activities to be part of the “more” this group should sustain with “less.” This grantee was shoveling increasingly scarce general support dollars to these programs. The organization only recovered after it jettisoned underfunded projects and sacrificed the foundation grants that had ultimately harmed the organization.

Another grantee relied heavily on one foundation for significant support of its largest program, subject to an arbitrary cap of 15 percent of overhead expenses. The true cost of its organization overhead was closer to 25 percent, and its net assets plunged as the group tapped unrestricted funds to pay for its core needs.

In fact, I see far too many organizations trying to do “more” by sacrificing living wages for its staff, shifting the cost of benefits to employees, cutting professional development budgets, and working with obsolete technology.

An article in the Stanford Social Innovation Review in 2009 described what they called the nonprofit starvation cycle, and attributed much of that problem to funders:

“The first step in the cycle is funders’ unrealistic expectations about how much it costs to run a nonprofit. At the second step, nonprofits feel pressure to conform to funders’ unrealistic expectations. At the third step, nonprofits respond to this pressure in two ways: they spend too little on overhead, and they underreport their expenditures on tax forms and in fundraising materials. This underspending and underreporting in turn perpetuates funders’ unrealistic expectations. Over time, funders expect grantees to do more and more with less and less—a cycle that slowly starves nonprofits.”

So, let’s dispense with tired clichés. Jan Masaoka, director and editor-in-chief of Blue Avocado and former executive director of CompassPoint Nonprofit Services, has better advice for nonprofit leaders: do less with less.

“Of course there is more need, more demand, and we probably have less money. And we love the gritty heartfelt nature of the cry, “We need to do more with less!” Pause. But it’s not only unsustainable, it probably means you will be able to do even less in the future. If a program’s funding has been cut by 30%, you may need to do 30% less.”

The trick, of course, is figuring out which programs are most effective, and make those as sustainable as possible. As funders, we can help our grantees do this in several ways by:

  1. More clearly communicating with grantees about our own strategies as funders, and the outcomes we hope to achieve. These conversations have the potential to surface more creative, efficient and effective alternatives to the projects or activities that we may have historically funded.
  2. Forging stronger relationships with grantees, so that they feel comfortable approaching us when trouble arises and before the organization’s financial situation becomes dire.
  3. Understanding and supporting the real costs associated with running an effective and sustainable organization, including livable wages and quality benefits to recruit and retain quality staff, maintaining adequate facilities with current technology, and building sound financial and fundraising infrastructure.

Paul Beaudet is Associate Director of Wilburforce Foundation and a member of CEP’s Advisory Board.

 

What Strategy Is…And Isn’t – Hint: It’s Not Rocket Science

Tuesday, January 3rd, 2012

Strategy is something that people in philanthropy seem to talk about a lot.  What they do, though, may be another matter.  In recent months, I’ve had a number of conversations with philanthropic leaders who admit that they’re still somewhat perplexed when it comes to creating and implementing a solid strategy for their investments.

  • A senior consultant was asked by two large national foundations to create a strategy for them, but when he presented that strategy, the funders said they were “only interested in how many people we reached”—outputs, in other words.  When the consultant tried to emphasize the importance of linking those to a larger strategic framework, they responded, “We only care about results.”
  • The deputy director of a large regional foundation, charged with helping each of her program staff members create a grantmaking strategy, expressed frustration about their tendency to “drill down immediately to tactics,” rather than grappling with clarifying the goals and rationale for those efforts first.  She wondered how to help them understand that “without the why, they won’t be able to assess whether the tactics they decided to use were effective.”
  • A foundation official speaking at a conference said his foundation’s strategy was to “end homelessness in their community.”   An audience member, also a foundation executive, responded by observing that this seemed to be a goal, rather than a strategy, and that the two seemed to increasingly be “conflated in ways that lead to confusion about what philanthropic institutions are doing, how and why.”

These anecdotes are hardly evidence of a trend, but they’re a few of many examples I’ve seen indicating that the concept of strategy remains murky, despite all the publications and tools available to help people who work in philanthropy dispel that cloud.

But why? It’s hard to say for sure. Perhaps it’s because creating a strategy and then rolling it out in ways that will achieve impact are all different parts of one complex concept—and none by themselves are easy to do, let alone in combination.  Another reason may be that the array of sometimes expensive and confoundingly complex strategic planning products available can leave even the smartest foundation officials scratching their heads in confusion.  Others point to the influx of a new set of players in philanthropy, including young people or those whose backgrounds make them more interested in doing than in navel-gazing, which is sometimes how strategy is characterized.

Perhaps the most commonly cited reason for funders to eschew more intentional and rigorous strategy development is that there’s little incentive for them do to so, given that philanthropic institutions tend to operate with few formal accountability structures, especially those that are externally imposed.  As the public, however, becomes less enamored with institutions, particularly those that are seen as reluctant to adopt the open source ethos that’s becoming a cultural norm, there will be more, not less, demand for accountability and transparency from even the most closed-door organizations.  And unlike some foundations that define transparency as publishing an annual report or articles describing what they’re supporting, the public, especially grantseekers, have long known that real transparency is when funders are clear about what they’re doing, the decision making criteria they’re using to make investment decisions, and how they’re going to assess themselves in those efforts.  In short, people want to know:  What’s your strategy and why?

Fortunately, strategy isn’t really that complicated.  While it does require the ability to think logically and articulate a rationale as to why a particular path is chosen over another, it isn’t rocket science.  Nor should it take forever and serve as a proxy for actually doing something. How many times have you heard ‘We’re revising our strategy’ from foundations that you thought did that already last year… and the year before that… and before that…?

What strategy can do, however, is make a better rocket—and one that lands where it should. And who doesn’t want that?

To help make things a bit less mystical, and thus, more likely to be applied in daily practice, we might take a page from the book of some wise people who were developing effective funding strategies long before the advent of the strategy gurus.  One of those people was Andrew (a pseudonym), with whom I had the good fortune to work.  Andrew came to philanthropy after organizing thousands of women in one of the country’s poorest communities to secure child care subsidies they needed to stay employed—a result that led to significant changes in national welfare policy.  In addition to serving as the president of a foundation, Andrew also was the senior vice president at a family foundation with a national focus.

It’s worthwhile to note that Andrew didn’t have an Ivy League degree, hadn’t worked at a multinational consulting firm, and had probably never even read a book about philanthropic strategy.  He was, in fact, deeply skeptical of foundations and their capacity to make a difference, but was, at the same time, roundly viewed by his peers as a brilliant strategist because of his ability to home in on difficult problems with laser-like focus and get results.  He was also able to project out longer-term visions and predict which would have traction, but only as a function of rigorous evaluation and assessment—processes he built into every program he oversaw.

Lucky for those us who worked with Andrew, he was an excellent teacher from whose wisdom we benefitted.  While none of us would call ourselves strategy experts, we’ve all been able to apply what we learned from him to our work with different kinds of foundations—traditional/private, family, corporate, community, and technology.  Serving in a variety of capacities at these organizations, we’ve developed and implemented strategies that have had legs and longer-term impact (we know, because we learned the importance of building in metrics and benchmarks to evaluate that way before they’d become philanthropic buzzwords).

We’ve also learned a lot about what separates a good strategy from one that’s not so good—mostly because we’ve experienced our share of failures—and what strategy is and isn’t.  Most importantly, we learned a process through which we can create effective strategies—one that’s served us and the institutions for which we’ve worked well.

The basic tenets of that process are fairly straightforward and some have been discussed many times before, but they bear repeating.  So, in true open source fashion—something that Andrew also practiced before it landed in the zeitgeist—they are shared below.

Developing an effective strategy starts with an open mind and a willingness to step back and explore all options.   When developing strategy, it’s important to assume a position of explorer, rather than expert.  Andrew, in fact, tended to hire people who had a broad range of experience as generalists able to see the big picture and flesh that out with important details, as well as the ability to identify the gaps, assets, opportunities, and challenges associated with issues or problems.

They were also skilled at exploring and answering questions such as:

- What are the most important issues in a particular domain?
- What are the debates occurring among various practitioners and theorists about those issues?
- What kinds of efforts are being tested in communities?
- Which are promising?
- What field-building is needed to support those efforts?
- What does the data and research say about the issue/projects/trends?

People working for Andrew were asked to provide answers to those questions, but in a way that was as unbiased and objective as possible—and, preferably, based on information that had some evidence behind it.

This approach was in contrast to what occurs in some philanthropic institutions, which usually involves one of two scenarios.  The first involves hiring experts on specific subjects or issues as program staff and then charging them with developing programs based on that expertise.  The second is commissioning outside consultants to conduct environmental scans but then using only the part of those reports that “fit” with the funder’s predilection for a particular strategy as the rationale for pursuing that strategy.  Missed in both of these approaches is an awareness that deep knowledge of a particular subject can sometimes be accompanied by deep biases about what’s “best”—a stance that mitigates the likelihood of identifying alternative, new and/or more effective options for effective strategies.  Even experts, after all, don’t know everything and, in fact, can be saddled with more misguided preconceptions than the novice.

Other philanthropic institutions simply don’t give program officers the space and freedom to conduct serious and thoughtful analyses of the issues or domains in which they’re working.  A colleague who recently interviewed for a job at a foundation, for example, was asked by senior officials what she would fund if she assumed oversight over a particular program.  When she replied that she couldn’t answer that question thoughtfully because she hadn’t had the chance to look more deeply at what the field needed, what the best approaches were, and/or what was really working, the interviewers were astounded, having assumed that she’d have her strategy set in stone before she even started.  Fortunately, that didn’t deter her from getting the job, and, to the foundation’s credit, they allowed her the room to dig deeper, which led to the development of two new programs that were later nationally recognized as being instrumental to moving a policy agenda.  Those results, in turn, spurred the institution to incorporate this process across all program areas—one that’s still used currently.

Create a template for strategy development that’s supported by research, analysis, and evidence.  Inherent in Andrew’s strategy development process was a template that included the following elements: a comprehensive overview of the issue/field/area being examined (rather than just the parts that interest the program officer or its executive staff); a compelling and evidence-based rationale for why the foundation should be engaged in this issue/field/area (and not just because the program officer or executive staff think it should); a discussion of the foundation’s historical interests, experience, and/or mission and how it relates to the issue/area/field (and if there is no relation, why there should be now); a set of goals the funder could consider pursuing, as well as objectives for each of those goals; and the strategies that would be best to implement in meeting those goals and objectives.  An essential piece of each of these components was describing, in detail, the why behind them.  Why should we do this and not that?  And on what basis are we making those decisions?  What are the pros and cons of each and why?

Goals are related to strategy, but they’re not the strategy.  ‘What would success look like’ isn’t a throwaway question, and it’s been reiterated in numerous strategy how-to guides, but it’s surprising how many funders still overlook the importance of this question as a critical starting point for creating effective strategies.  As one foundation vice president remarked, “I tried to get my younger staff members to think about the goals of their programs before coming up with strategies, but they stared at me like I was from Mars,” saying that “talking about the goals was too academic and airy-fairy.”

The distinction between goals and strategy isn’t just a semantic issue; they’re different concepts.  Goals are what we are striving toward; strategies are the way we get to them.  Goals should be the starting point, but, often, there’s a tendency to rush to the toolkit.  Skilled strategists argue that it’s almost impossible to develop effective strategies by starting with tactics, activities, or even strategies themselves. Instead, the best strategies start with the end goal at the top of the pyramid, with the rest flowing down from that, including objectives, strategies to meet those goals, and then activities or tactics.

Tactics/activities have to be linked to strategies.  It’s natural for people to want to jump right into the activities but doing so without attaching them to the why will most likely lead to disappointment and, ultimately, failure—and a lot of wasted time and money.  That tendency isn’t limited to grantseekers; funders are equally as susceptible to fixating on the do without linking it to a strategy or goal.  But some funders have the opposite problem; they focus only on the issue itself, providing eloquent, academic arguments and analysis about poverty, education, or other “problems” and why they need to be addressed but then never say what, exactly, they think should be done about them.  It’s rare to see an artful and logical strategy linking both tactics and rationale, but when done well, this weaving offers a clearer picture of not only what funders are supporting, but why, how, and to what end—the essence of good strategy

Benchmarking and measurement aren’t just for grantees; funders should be using them in evaluating their own program planning and implementation efforts.  While there has been a lot of attention toward helping grantees build in metrics and benchmarks so they can be more readily evaluated, there has been less attention paid toward the need for funders to do likewise when developing and implementing their own program strategies. (Some of us, in fact, believe that considerable tension between grantees and funders could be reduced if funders were held to the same accountability standards to which they hold grantseekers.)

An important part of the template, therefore, is outlining, clearly, and preferably in quantitative terms whenever possible, how program staff is going to measure or assess each of the strategies and/or activities that will be part of the program.  Each element, for example, should be accompanied by indicators that answer the questions:

- What will progress look like to us—the foundation—not just the grantees—in terms of our ability to do what we said we were going to do and how will we know?
- What will we use to determine whether we’ve met our program objectives?
- How can we “operationalize” the objectives with indicators?
- What’s the timeline we anticipate to meet those objectives?
- Which can be done sooner and which require a longer time period?

Strategy isn’t a box; it’s a membrane.   People tend to bristle at the notion of indicators or metrics because they can feel limiting or as if they’re “boxing us in” and, indeed, in some ways, they are because they’re a prompt for “concretizing the vision” in ways that invite more accountability for what’s supported and what isn’t.  But programs don’t operate in a vacuum; times change as does the context within which programs are operating.  A strategy focused on long-term change around a particular issue, for example, may need to be more flexible and/or tweaked if an opportunity suddenly emerges that may not fit the original template but is one that would clearly enhance the likelihood of added impact.

Thus, while it’s important for funders to have a solid strategy behind their efforts, it’s equally important for them to review that strategy on a regular, consistent basis to see what’s working and what’s not—a process that is helped by having good progress indicators in place.  In Andrew’s model, we were asked to develop this template with a three-to-five-year timespan but with the understanding that we would, every six months or so, re-examine it to assess the progress wewere making in the context of the indicators we’d stipulated.  This process allowed us to see where there was a need for tweaking or, in some cases, making more profound changes to the original strategy.

Strategy includes an assessment of what other investors are doing.  Like many of us, funders can easily become wrapped up in their own sense of importance and/or buried in their own cultures to the extent that they forget to look around and see what others are doing.  As part of Andrew’s process, we not only shared our strategy papers/templates with other staff members but also with peers at other foundations to get their feedback and insights as to what they thought we should be doing, either in ways that would leverage or complement their efforts or address gaps they were unable to resolve. While this kind of collaboration is gradually increasing in philanthropy, it’s still relatively rare for funders to proactively engage their colleagues in open conversations about their strategies, despite the potential for enhanced learning—something that needs to change, particularly at a time of decreased resources.

Theories of change are nice, but they’re not enough.  When used appropriately, theories of change can be very helpful in developing effective strategies, but they aren’t a proxy for strategy—a trap that some funders fall into when describing what they’re doing.  Theories of change, generally, don’t usually include the how or why behind a problem or issue, nor do they explicitly detail tactics or strategies.  Rather, they offer a set of assumptions about how an investor views a particular issue or problem and how it should be addressed—a rubric from which the rest of a strategy can emanate.

Good strategies find the nexus between feasible investment options and institutional focus.  Conducting a comprehensive exploration process to pinpoint areas of possible investment is only one part of good strategy.  The other part is matching these findings with the institution’s overall focus, history, or legacy—a step that’s sometimes ignored.  A foundation that’s been historically focused on higher education, for example, isn’t necessarily going to eagerly embrace a community-organizing or ham-fisted advocacy strategy.  A funder who’s supported nonprofit technological innovation isn’t going to view a strategy focused on capital endowments as a particularly compelling way to leverage their experiences or investments.  A good planning process, therefore, will highlight the intersection between a funder’s interests and experience in ways that will help leverage the latter more strategically.

The process to develop strategy should inform, not shame.  Just as it’s hard for grantees to tell funders about failures, it’s hard for funders to admit them, largely because few institutions invite that kind of candor, nor is there much incentive for it.   Developing effective program strategies can and should be opportunities for strengthening communication and collaboration not only within philanthropic institutions but across them.  When program officers are encouraged to present their strategies to their colleagues in a atmosphere that’s intellectually challenging, yet supportive, it can lay the foundation for more openness about their progress as the strategy unfolds, including what didn’t work and what did and why—information that’s critical to deciding whether the strategy should change.

 * * * * * * * *

These are just a few of the pearls of wisdom gleaned from Andrew and others like him who’ve since helped to prod funders into being more strategic about their efforts.  There are certainly many more.  What’s important to remember, though, is that none of these require a Ph.D. to understand or integrate into practice; they’re merely a set of guideposts that can help lead to the creation of better programs, and ultimately, results.

Those kinds of guideposts are going to become even more important as funders operate in an environment in which the demand for more accountability is growing across a wide spectrum of institutions and domains, as well as in a world in which the problems facing philanthropy are more complex than ever before.  That context suggests funders will need to be even more intentional about clarifying what philanthropic investments they’re making and why and with what anticipated results.  Integrating a more thoughtful process for developing strategies with a higher potential for success can be the first step toward meeting that challenge.  Thankfully, that isn’t rocket science.

Cynthia M. Gibson, Ph.D., is an independent consultant for a wide range of national nonprofits and foundations who serves as a strategist, thought leader, and writer.

Evaluation Roundtable Study Highlights the Role of the CEO in Evaluation

Wednesday, November 16th, 2011

report written by Elizabeth Heid Thompson and Patricia Patrizi (and currently available on the CEP website) explores the extent to which foundations evaluate the results of their work. An examination of 31 foundations that have demonstrated a commitment to evaluation over time highlights several key facts.

According to the report, published for the Evaluation Roundtable, funding to support evaluative activities has decreased despite an increase in the demand for the information those activities produce. The number of foundation staff devoted to these activities has also declined in recent years.

Much of the current investment in evaluation is focused on performance metrics, often administrative metrics, rather than on the measurement of the strategy behind the work or on the implementation process. In fact, many evaluation leaders raised the following concerns about the metrics used:

  • That the metrics they were tracking did not adequately align with their strategies;
  • That their investments did not make a difference in moving the needle; and
  • That metrics chosen often reflect goals too distant to inform the way a strategy is implemented.

The good news discovered in this research, which took place in 2009, was about the role of foundation CEOs in the evaluation process. They report that when the evaluation unit reports to the CEO, more financial resources will be provided, the evaluations will be more widely distributed and more attention will be paid to the findings.

 

Guest Post: How the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Seeks To Improve

Monday, October 3rd, 2011
At the Center for Effective Philanthropy, we believe that improved performance of philanthropic funders can have a positive impact on nonprofit organizations and the people and communities they serve. As part of our work, we aim to highlight stories from funders who share that vision and who value the role of data and assessment in efforts to increase their impact.

 

PROCESS PROGRESS: HOW RWJF STRIVES TO IMPROVE
by Robin Mockenhaupt, Ph.D., M.P.H., Chief of Staff,
Dee Colello, Senior Manager, Program Operations, and
David Adler, M.P.A., Communications Officer
of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

 

They must often change, who would be constant in happiness or wisdom. ~Confucius

Change and continual improvement is a valued part of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s culture. It’s in our guiding principles, which state, “We must commit ourselves to lifelong learning and continual improvement.” In addition to change and improvement, RWJF is also committed to transparency and peer learning, and it is in that vein that we are sharing our progress on quality improvement since 2004.

As part of our 2004 annual organizational assessment, we commissioned the Center for Effective Philanthropy’s Grantee Perception Report (GPR). We learned that while our grantees rated us comparatively well in several areas, we were using up a lot of grantee time meeting our administrative demands and we weren’t moving as fast as we needed to in processing grants. We also learned we needed better clarity in our communications of goals and strategies.

A 2011 CEP case study, Frequent Checkups Make for Healthier Funding Relationships, illustrated that we changed. We wanted to share one of the ways we took that advice to heart.

With the findings from the GPR, input from an all-staff retreat, and a focus group of grantees, we developed our first Foundation-wide Quality Improvement (QI) initiative. Our process for implementing this QI project can be broken down to five steps.

  • We set the right tone. The all-staff retreat and the announcement of the QI process by our president and CEO, Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, M.D., M.B.A., helped create widespread buy-in among staff. Any organization considering quality improvement projects should recognize that having the buy-in and public support of the CEO is a crucial first step for setting the appropriate environment for change.
  • We started with something manageable. The initial focus of our quality improvement work was on a category of grants that accounts for about 20 percent of our grantmaking. We wanted to start with something manageable to see how it worked before rolling out broader efforts.
  • We gathered the troops. After the announcement, staff interested in quality improvement convened to map out current grantmaking processes; shortly after that, a smaller core staff team was chartered, supported by a group of project sponsors from senior management.
  • We jumped in. The team designed a pilot. After testing and implementation, the project moved into control (maintenance) phase. Our first QI project resulted in sequencing and prioritizing steps in our grantmaking process, as well as launching the Foundation’s Program Information Management System (PIMS).  After our first QI project, two other projects were designed and implemented, using a similar structure and process. In addition, three smaller projects were led by staff trained in the QI process.
  • We are monitoring ongoing progress. We needed a way to monitor how we were doing and for identifying new ideas for improvement. We organized a standing staff group called the Process Improvement Group to help track metrics for our grantmaking and to initiate new quality improvement initiatives. Additionally, other units within RWJF have taken up their own quality improvement initiatives.

What did we learn?

  • Communications is a key component to implementing quality initiatives and staff behavior change.
  • Staff like being involved in cross-functional improvement projects
    when they see the need for change and can be a part of the solution.
    It’s also an opportunity to involve staff at every level of the
    organization.
  • Staff need dedicated time for QI work, as opposed to trying to “fit it in” around other responsibilities.
  • Over time, managers learned better how to scope and implement QI projects.
  • The automation of our grantmaking process (which initially was
    paper) allowed for project milestones and timelines to be standardized
    and to become transparent to all staff.

 

We’re pleased that more recent CEP reports have concluded our grantee perceptions have gotten better over time, and we believe our quality improvement efforts were a factor in this change. Our responsiveness measures are now higher as well as our quality of interactions. With that said, all our quality improvement efforts were not successful and we are receptive to revising any processes that may have missed the mark. For example, we are still working toward reducing the amount of time in both selection process and improving our ongoing monitoring and reporting.

We’re happy to share additional information about our QI process and are eager to hear how our colleagues are approaching this as well.

Esther Duflo Explains Why She Believes Randomized Controlled Trials Are So Vital

Thursday, June 23rd, 2011

Even before Esther Duflo rose to speak at the Center for Effective Philanthropy’s (CEP) 2011 conference, she had already stirred controversy. Her well-known belief in the ability of randomized controlled trails to understand the effectiveness of policy interventions in developing countries brings up strong feelings among some in the philanthropy world.

As Ford Foundation president Luis Ubiñas said in his introduction of Duflo, “Feelings runs so deep about Esther that Phil [Buchanan] actually received some tough emails about her coming to speak here to us.”

But Duflo seemed to quickly win the crowd over.

“I’m sure I’m not very dangerous,” said Duflo, professor of Poverty Alleviation and Development Economics at MIT. “I speak with a funny French accent. I don’t bite.”

In explaining her approach, Duflo said that discussions about foreign aid often devolve into a debate about whether the aid works or not. It is impossible to resolve that debate by staying on that level, said Duflo who is founder and director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab.  For one, the question of whether aid works is not particularly well defined, she said. Second, aid is a small part of developing countries’ overall budgets. For example, aid comprises about 5.7% of the budgets of African countries that receive it.

“A big part of my work is to try and shift the conversation from whether aid is good or bad to think about policy or programs instead,” Duflo said. “Another objective of my work is to think about not just the five percent [of aid], but the 100 percent.  [That is], what role this five percent can play in improving the quality of programs. I want to think about the efforts of most private donors…as not being an end in itself, but as being venture capitalism and finding the good ideas in development. In that case, think of each dollar you are spending as being multiplied many, many fold. If these programs help us identify what really works then that can be taken up as a policy on a very large scale. That is the reason for my work and the reason for placing so much emphasis on the evaluation of specific programs.”

Duflo cited several examples from the book she co-authored Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty.

“I thought I would identify surprising facts that I didn’t know and maybe you didn’t know either and that would have been difficult to know without employing the kinds of methods we work with, particularly randomized controlled trials,” she said.  “The first one is that sometimes you save money by paying people.”

Childhood vaccines are generally available for free and yet each year millions of children go without basic immunization, Duflo said. She described a randomized controlled trial of three immunization camps in rural India.  She found that by giving parents an incentive to go to the camps to immunize their children—in the form of one kilo of lentils for each child immunized—the rate of immunization increased from 6% to 38%. (For more on this topic, see Duflo’s TED Talk.)

She said it the trial showed that it actually saves money to give the lentils. The cost for a child to be fully immunized in a camp without the incentives was $50 while it was $27 in a camp with incentives. That’s because the camps must pay for a nurses’ time regardless of the number of children they immunize. At the camps with incentives, nurses immunized more children and the costs per immunization decreased.

“Because of the randomization, seeing the effect is very transparent and easy,” she said.

Duflo said that findings like these challenge what she calls the three “I”s of development policy: ideology, ignorance and inertia.

“Programs are often borne in ideology,” she said, “[An ideology that] the poor are entrepreneurs, or they are starving or they are slothful. [Programs] are conceived in ignorance of the reality of the field, and then they persist because once they exist there is a consistency for them to just continue. I think we need to fight against that.”

As an example of the three “I”s Duflo cited a government policy in India to have village education committees on which villagers serve. That policy has not worked as planned.During the question and answer period, audience members asked Duflo to expand on her ideas.

At the end of the session in response to one question, Duflo showed how she can be both soft-spoken and laser sharp in her point of view.

“From our position of being reasonably well off and comfortable, [perhaps] university professors, we tend to be patronizing about the poor in a very specific sense, which is that we tend to think, ‘Why don’t they take more responsibility for their lives?’ And what we are forgetting is that the richer you are the less responsibility you need to take for your own life because everything is taken care for you. And the poorer you are the more you have to be responsible for everything about your life….My lesson is to stop berating people for not being responsible and start to think of ways instead of providing the poor with the luxury that we all have, which is that a lot of decisions are taken for us. If we do nothing, we are on the right track. For most of the poor, if they do nothing, they are on the wrong track.”

More highlights from Duflo’s talk at CEP’s conference will be available on CEP’s YouTube channel soon.

Susan Parker is owner of Clear Thinking Communications